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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of lJtah 
JOSEPH M. PERKINS, )' 
ESTHER J. PERKINS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. \ 
RICHARD L. SPENCER, ( 
GRACE N. SPENCER, ) 
Defendants. 
J 
CASE 
NO. 7565 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiffs-appellants and defendants-respondents 
entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract, (attached 
Exhibit "A") on or about the 26th day of May, 1949, by 
which contract the defendants-respondents agreed to sell 
and the plaintiffs-appellants agreed to buy certain real es-
tate located in Provo, Utah, for the sum of $10,500.00, 
payable $2,500.00 cash and $75.00 or more per month be-
ginning June 26, 1949, with interest on deferred payments 
at 5% per annum, payable monthly, with provisions that 
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"monthly payments be applied first to the payment of in-
terest, and second to reduction of principal." 
The Contract (attached Exhibit "A") carries the fol-
lowing provision: 
"In the event of a failure to comply with the terms 
hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure to make any pay-
ments when the same shall become due, or within 30 
days thereafter, the Seller shall ,at his option, be re-
leased from all obligations in law and equity to convey 
said property, and all payments which have been made 
theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be 
forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for the 
non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees 
that the Seller may, at his option, re-enter and take 
possession of said premises without legal process as 
in its first and former estate, together with all improve-
ments and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and 
the said additions and improvements shall remain with 
the land and become the property of the Seller, the 
Buyer becoming at once a tenant at will of the Seller. 
It is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement." 
During negotiations between the parties there was no 
reference or discussion by either Buyer or Seller of the for-
feiture clause set forth above, nor what the damage would 
be in the event of breach of the Contract set forth above. 
The real estate agent for the Seller selected the printed con-
tract form, and instructed his secretary to fill in the blanks. 
The Buyer paid the down payment of $2,500.00 and three 
of the $75.00 per month installments, making a total paid 
by them of $2,725.00. The last payment was made August 
25, 1949. The Buyers failed to pay further installments, 
and on November 3, 1949, the Sellers served notice that 
unless the Buyers paid the delinquency within five days, the 
Buyers were tenants at will of the Sellers, and would for-
j I 
\ 
p 
I 
~ I 
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feit, as liquidated damages, all moneys paid in performance 
of the Contract. No payment was made within the five 
days allowed by the foregoing notice, and on November 9, 
1949, the Sellers caused another notice to be prepared in 
which they informed the Buyers that they were then ten-
ants at will of the Sellers, and served Notice requiring them 
to vacate the premises within five days after service of 
said notice. This notice was not served personally upon 
Joseph M. Perkins, and no copy was transmitted to him 
through the mail. Memorandum Decision, pgs. 3, 4. 
On or about the 7th day of November, 1949, the Buy-
ers commenced an action in the District Court of Utah 
County against the Sellers, seeking rescission of the afore-
said contract upon the grounds of fraud, or in the alterna-
tive, reformation of the contract upon the basis of mistake. 
The Sellers, on or about the 18th day of November, 1949, 
commenced an action in Unlawful Detainer against the Buy-
ers in the City Court of Provo City. The Buyers answered 
the action in the City Court of Provo City, and pleaded an-
other action pending in the District Court of Utah County 
The Sellers then answered the Buyers' complaint in the ac-
tion pending in the District Court of Utah County and coun-
ter-claimed for unlawful detainer, and in the alternative, 
for specific performance of the contract. The Buyers in 
their reply in the action in the District Court of Utah Coun-
ty, defended upon the grounds that the Sellers had elected 
to recover the property in question and could not obtain 
specific performance. The Buyers pleaded a counterclaim 
in their reply, alleging said election of remedies by the Sel-
lers, and praying for restitution of all amounts paid by 
them to Sellers, and alleging that the forfeiture provisions 
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of said contract were void because they provided for a pen-
alty and not liquidated damages. 
The Court in the District Court action in Utah County 
granted the Sellers a nonsuit on the Buyers' cause of ac-
tion for rescission and reformation. Memorandum Deci-
sion, pg. 5. The Court also found that the Sellers had elect-
ed to rescind the contract, and were not entitled to specific 
performance. Memorandum Decision, pg. 11. The Court 
held the Buyer, Mrs. Esther J. Perkins, guilty of unlawful 
detainer. Memorandum Decision, pg. 14. The Court fur-
ther found that the forfeiture provided by the contract was 
not a penalty, but was liquidated damages. Memorandum 
Decision, pg. 13. 
PLAINTIFFS' POINTS 
1-The Court erred in assessing $532.50 damages by reason 
of the unlawful detainer of the said Esther J. Perkins, 
and in holding the plaintiff Esther J. Perkins guilty of 
unlawful detainer. 
2-The Court erred in holding the forfeiture provision of 
the contract was not a penalty. 
POINT ONE 
The Court held that the Plaintiff, Joseph M. Perkins, 
was not guilty of unlawful detainer. Perkins was at least 
a tenant at will as is provided for by the Contract. see 
F1orfeiture Clause). In our state, such a tenancy may not 
be terminated except by the procedure set forth in the Code, 
Sec. 104-60-3 (5), Utah Code Annotated, 1943, and prior 
to the terminating of the tenancy, the tenant has the pos-
session and control of the premises. 35 C. J. 953. Since I 
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by definition, a tenant at will has the possession and con-
trol during the life of the tenancy, it would seem to follow 
that the owner of the fee does not have sufficient interest 
to bring unlawful detainer against anyone but the tenant. 
Therefore, it would seem that Mrs. Perkins could not be 
guilty of unlawful detainer so long as her husband's tenancy 
at will was not terminated. 
If the above argument be valid, then it follows, of 
course, that the judgment for damages for unlawful de-
tainer can not be sustained. The Court in Forrester v. 
Cook, 77 U. 137, 292 P. 206, held that "damages must be 
the natural and proximate consequences of the unlawful 
detainer and nothing more." If there be no unlawful de-
tainer, it follows there can be no damages. 
THE FAILURE OF ESTHER J. PERKINS TO MOVE 
OUT OF THE HOUSE DID NOT CAUSE SPENCERS 
ANY DAMAGE. 
Even if there were unlawful detainer, it is difficult to 
see how the Sellers were damaged. They had no right to 
possession since the tenancy at will of Joseph M. Perkins 
was undetermined. Any damages, therefore, would seem 
to be by reason of the Sellers' failure to terminate both 
joint tenancies, and not be reason of the occupancy by Mrs. 
Perkins. Even if Mrs. Perkins had moved, the Sellers would 
have been in the same position so far as their damages are 
concerned. They still would not have had· the right to pos-
session until they terminated her husband's tenancy, and 
would not be damaged by Mrs. Perkins unless she remained 
thereafter. 36 . C. J. S., p. 1159. 
Forrester v. Cook, 77 U. 137, 292 P. 206. 
Buchanan v. Crites, 160 U. 428, 150 P2d 100. 
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Here we are not concerned with damages for breach of 
Contract, but are considering the damages which were the 
direct and natural result of Esther J. Perkins' failure to 
move out of the property in question after having received 
defendants' Notice to Vacate. It is respectfully submitted 
that there have been no damages resulting from Esther J. 
Perkins' failure to move. The defendants have lost noth-
ing! 
POINT TWO 
The law in this state as to what constitutes a penalty 
has undergone a distinct evolution since the first case 
which considered the question. Dopp vs. Richards, 43 U. 
332, 135 P. 98. The law early recognized that even though 
a contract by its terms called for liquidated damages, in 
fact, may provide for a penalty. Just when this is the case 
may be difficult to determine, and the Courts have used 
several tests. 
WHERE THE DAMAGES PROVIDED FOR IN THE 
AGREEMENT ARE DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE 
SEVERAL COVENANTS THEREIN PROVIDED, THEY 
WILL BE CONSTRUED AS A PENALTY RATHER 
THAN LIQUIDATED DAMAGES. 
The first case to announce this test was Dopp v. Rich-
ards, 43 U. 332, 135 P. 98, where the Court was consider-
ing a forfeiture provision similar to that in the Unifonn 
Real Estate Contract marked Exhibit "A". The next Utah 
_ case to utilize this test was Western Macaroni Mfg. v. Fiore, 
47 U. 108, 151 P. 984 (1915), where the Court said, "where 
an agreement imposes several distinct duties or obligations 
of different degrees of importance, and the same sum is 
named as damages for the breach of either indifferently, 
~ 
I 
I 
" I I 
I 
• 
' . 
' j 
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the sum is to be regarded as a penalty." This case was 
cited and approved in Calambra Corp. v. Abels, (Okla.) 
95 P2d 601 (1939), where the Court held a reversion clause 
in a contract to be a penalty. 
In the case before the Court, there are six covenants: 
(1) to pay $75.00 per month; (2) to pay the balance due 
when the Bountiful house is sold; (3) upon request, se-
cure a loan upon the property; ( 4) pay all taxes and spe-
cial improvements; (5) pay general taxes after June 1, 
1949; and (6) keep all buildings insured for $8,000.00, 
and assign insurance policy to Seller. The Buyer could for-
feit the same amount for failure to perform any of these 
Covenants. Covenant No. 1 would be broken by failure to 
make one installment of $75.00, while Covenant No.2 would 
b~ broken by failure to pay $8,000.00 as the balance due. 
The remainder of the Covenants would all result in differ-
ent damages if broken. It is obvious that these Covenants 
would all result in different damages if broken, and under 
the above test, the provision of the Contract is to be con-
strued as a penalty. This Contract attempts to give the 
Sellers the right to forfeit the Contract and all money paid 
upon the breach of any one of the six foregoing Covenants. 
ORDINARILY, IF DAMAGES ARE DIFFICULT TO 
ASCERTAIN, THE PROVISION WILL BE CONSTRJUED 
AS FOR LIQUIDATED DAMAGES, AND IF THEY ARE 
NOT DIFICULT TO ASCERTAIN, AS ONE FOR A PEN-
ALTY . . . . 25 C. J. S., p. 666. 
What would be the measure of damages in the event 
of breach of a Contract such as this one? In Dopp v. Rich-
ards, 43 U. 332, 135 P. 98, it is said: 
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"We think that the. better reason and greater 
weight of authority sustain the rule that under such 
circumstances the measure of damage is the difference 
between the value of the land at the time of breach 
. . . . and the Contract price to be paid, together 
with the interest on the purchase price unpaid." 
The only evidence entered in this case is to the effect 
that the house recovered was of the value of $10,281.00. 
(See Luke Clegg's testimony, TRS.) The purchase price 
was $10,500.00. This indicates a damage of $219.00. The 
interest on the unpaid balance equalled about $33.00 per 
month, totaling $165.00. Thus we see the total damage 
by this test is equal to $384.00. Plaintiffs had paid $2,-
725.00. 
"But where there is an absolute agreement to do 
a particular act, followed by a stipulation as to dam-
ages in case of a breach, and the nature of the tran-
saction is such that there can be no inherent difficulty 
in ascertaining actual damages, and the amount named 
is so excessive that it will not only make the other par-
ty whole, but form an exhorbitant and unconscionable 
recovery, it will be held that the amount named should 
be regarded as a penalty." 
Thomas v. Foulger, 264 P. 975, 71 U. 274. 
Bramwell Inc. v. Uggla, 16 P2d 913, 81 U. 85. 
Davis v. U. S~, 17 Ct. Cl. 201, 215. 
It is submitted that in this case there is no inherent 
difficulty in ascertaining or measuring the damages inci-
dent to the breach of the Contract by the Buyers. It is 
to be noticed that the forfeiture clause is entirely unilateral 
in its operation. 
I 
I 
~ 
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DAMAGES FOR THE BREACH OF CONTRACTS 
FOR THE PAYMENT OF MONEY ARE FIXED AND 
LIQUIDATED BY LAW, AND NEITHER REQUIRE NOR 
ARE SUSCEPTIBLE OF LIQUIDATION BY THE PAR-
TES . . . . 17 C. J. p. 954. 
In Truitt v. Patten, ___ u ___ , 287 P. 179 (1930) 
and again in Croft v. Jensen, 86 U. 13, 40 P2d 198 (1935) 
the Court said: 
"The ordinary rules as to liquidated damages may 
be said to be inapplicable to Contracts for the payment 
of money only. In such cases the Courts construe the 
damages.as a penalty, irrespective of the intent of the 
parties or the language by which it is expressed. The 
principle is that the damages for the breach of Con-
tracts for the payment of money is fixed and liqui-
dated by law, and neither require nor are susceptible 
of liquidation by the parties, interest being the legal 
measure of damages in all such cases." 
In the Croft v. Jensen the Court had before it a Con-
tract which appears to be the same as is involved in this 
case. In the instant case the only covenant remaining un-
fulfilled by the Buyers was the Covenant to pay money and 
thus it comes squarely within the above rule. 
ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT CONCLUSIVE, AS A BROAD 
GENERAL RULE THE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES 
DETERMINES WHETHER A PROVISION IN A CON-
TRAer IS FOR A PENALTY OR FOR LIQUIDATED 
DAMAGES WHICH INTENTION IS DETERMINED BY 
A CONSIDERATION OF THE CONTRACT AS A WHOLE 
TOGETHER WITH THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTAN-
CES THEREOF . . . . 25 C. J. S. p. 659 .. 
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In this case the Court below relies upon a Utah case 
which falls between Dopp v. Richards and Croft v. Jensen, 
cited Supra, and the test of the "Intent of the Parties" is 
applied (pp. 11, 12, 13 Memo Decision), in Cooley v. Call, 
___ u , 211 P: 977, the Court said: 
"The final payment was to be made December 1, 
1921, or within two years and five days from the exe-
cution of the Contract. So it could readily be foreseen 
by the parties to the Contract at the time it was exe-
cuted just what plaintiff's damages would probably be 
when the last payment became due, even if defendants 
should default in every subsequent payment provided 
for by the Contract. A simple mathematical calcula-
tion demonstrates that the $1,850.00 paid by the de-
fendants amounted to at least 10 per cent per annum 
on the purchase price of the property . . . . '' 
"In conclusion, to avoid misunderstanding, our de-
cision of this case is based entirely upon what we con-
ceive to be the obvious in~ntion of the parties at the 
time they executed the Contract . . . . " 
(1) In the instant case it is true that the down pay-
ment equals about 25% of the purchase price. 
This fact is merely coincidental. The Court in 
the above case makes no mention of this fact or 
measurement and attaches no significance to it. 
(2) In this case the Plaintiffs paid down $2,500.00 
and agreed to pay, and did pay for three months, 
$75.00 per month. The lower Court found that 
$75.00 per month is the "reasonable rental value" 
of the property. Every month the defendants 
were to get a reasonable return on their invest-
ment. Under these conditions it cannot be said 
that the parties intended the down payment to 
I 
I 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
provide the fund for the payment of interest or 
return on investment. It would seem to indicate 
exactly contrariwise. 
(3) What result do we get, if we use the mathematical 
test set out in Cooley v. Call? 
There the Court computed the time from 
date of execution to the date of filing suit. In 
this case the same period is six months. Divide 
balance due into the down payment and we get 
31.2%. 
To get the per annum return on defendants' 
investment-multiply by two. We get 62.4% re-
turn on the investment. 
(4) In Cooley v. Call, the Court was concerned about 
what the parties intended by their Contract, and 
they used the foregoing test to show that since 
the down payment equalled only 10% per annum 
return on the investment, that the parties must 
have intended the down payment to be liquidated 
damage . . . "damage fairly computed 
and estimated in advance." 
But in this case the parties provided that 
during the interim between making of the down 
payment and paying the balance that the plain-
tiffs would pay, each month, a sum equal to the 
"reasonable rental value" of the property. 
( 5) The lower Court in this case has mentioned the 
fact that defendants had to find another place to 
live and thus the uncertainty justified the forfeit-
ure provision in the Contract. 
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(a) The first answer t~ that is that this ele-
ment is not a proper element of damage. It was 
not made an element or an issue of the contract 
by the parties. 
(b) The second answer is that the parties them-
selves did not consider it as an element of dam-
age because they did not set a cert ain date for 
the balance to be paid. The balance was to be 
paid when the "house in Bountiful was sold." 
Apparently this might be ten years later without 
there being a breach of the Contract. For de-
fendants to make the claim that they were rely-
ing on the payment of the balance appears to be 
in the nature of an afterthought. 
(c) The third answer is that the Sellers reserved 
to themselves the right to mortgage the property 
at any time to the full extent of the unpaid bal-
ance due under the Contract. It also appears 
that the loan value on the property exceeded the 
down payment made by defendants on their new 
home. (See pp. 2 & 3, Memo Decision). Also 
the monthly payments on the new house were 
only about one-half of the payments to be made 
by the Plaintiffs. 
(6) In this instant case the evidence reveals that 
the parties did not consider nor discuss what 
the damage would be in the event of a breach of 
the Contract by the Buyers. (See stipulation of 
counsel on reopening of case in TRS). Thus we 
have no actual expressed intent of the parties. 
I 
4 
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\VHERE IT IS DOUBTFUL \VHETHER A PROVI-
SION SHOUULD BE DEEMED A PENAWY OR FOR 
LIQUIDATEID DAMAGES, THE COURTS INCLINE TO 
REGARD IT AS A PENALTY . . . 25 C. J. S.. p. 937. 
The general principle announced above has been widely 
adhered to by the Courts of many states. The predomin-
ant reason given for the rule is that by "so doing, the re-
covery can be apportioned to the actual damages or loss 
sustained." Our Utah Courts have announced the principle 
and it was specifically referred to in Western Macaroni 
~fg. Co. v. Fiore, 447 U. 108, 151 P. 984 (1915). 
In the instant case the actual damages suffered by De-
fendants were very small and the sum named to be forfeited 
was very large and assumes the aspects of a penalty rather 
than compensation for damages suffered. 
We respectfully submitted that under all of the tests 
announced and applied by our Court that the forfeiture 
provision in the Contract marked Exhibit "A" is a provision 
for a penalty and for that reason is void. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PETER M. LOWE, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs. 
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